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ROBERT T. ANDERSON*

Indian Water Rights and the Federal
Trust Responsibility
ABSTRACT
Although federal policy shifted from assimilation to pro-tribal
positions, the federal courts have quite consistently supported
Indian reserved water rights. Indian water rights, however, were
neglected by Congress in favor of non-Indian agricultural
development in the arid West. Modem litigation over tribal
rights takes place primarily in state courts that are tempted to
interpret the few U.S. Supreme Court cases in ways that protect
existing non-Indian uses over senior tribal water rights. Modern
Indian water rights settlements tend to protect existing nonIndian uses while providing substantialbenefits for tribes, but in
a haphazard manner. This article examines the history of Indian
water rights and concludes that the traditional practicably
irrigable acreage quantification standardshould be adhered to by
the courts -supplemented by the homeland theory that awards
water to fulfill all purposes behind creation of a reservation. The
author also argues that the Executive Branch should adopt firm
budgetary policies that promote settlements as an Administration
priorityin order to amelioratehistoric inequities in western water
development.
I. INTRODUCTION
The struggle by Indian tribes to maintain their property and
survival as distinct communities is revealed by examining the status and
treatment of Indian water rights by the federal government. Indian
reserved water rights are trust property with legal title held by the
United States.' They were first recognized in 1908 in Winters v. United
States.2 As such, one might expect to find that by now a trustee would
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Native American Law Center,
University of Washington School of Law.
1. See Criteria and Procedures for the Participation of the Federal Government in
Negotiations for the Settlement of Indian Water Rights Claims, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (Mar. 12,
1990) ("Indian water rights are vested property rights for which the United States has a
trust responsibility, with the United States holding legal title to such water in trust for the
benefit of the Indians."). See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 19
(Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005).
2. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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have developed an effective system for defining and protecting the trust
corpus. 3 However, instead of protecting Indian water rights, the federal
government has consistently expended the vast majority of its resources
developing water projects for non-Indian use. 4 The National Water
Commission in 1973 concluded that, "[in the history of the United States
Government's treatment of Indian tribes, its failure to protect Indian
water rights for use on the Reservations it set aside for them is one of the
sorrier chapters."5 The Commission recognized the trust responsibility of
the United States to tribes with respect to water and went on to
recommend that the United States quantify Indian water rights
exclusively in federal court. 6 The Commission also recommended that
some accommodation be made to non-Indians who the United States
7
encouraged to use water owned by Indian tribes.
The recommendations of the Commission have substantial
merit, but the federal government has not implemented them except in
isolated instances. In recent years, the United States has initiated only a
few cases to protect Indian water rights,8 but states have commenced
many general stream adjudications to determine Indian reserved rights
in state courts. 9 The litigation has not resulted in the delivery of
3. See COHEN, supra note 1, § 19.06, at 1221 (outlining the basis for federal trust
obligations). For a discussion of breach of trust litigation in the water rights arena, see
Cohen, supra note 1, § 19.06, at 1223-26. See also Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The
Department of Justice's Conflict of Interest in Representing Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L.
REV. 1307, 1362-64 (2003).
4. LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITs OF LAW 23
(1991). See also CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NExT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND
THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 258-59 (1992) [hereinafter WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT
MERIDIAN]; MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING
WATER (1986); Harold Sheperd, Conflict Comes to Roost! The Bureau of Reclamation and the
Federal Indian Trust Responsibility, 31 ENVTL. L. 901, 913-17 (2001).
5. NATL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 475 (1973). See also DANIEL
McCOoL, NATIVE WATERS: CONTEMPORARY INDIAN WATER SETTLEMENTS AND THE SECOND
TREATY ERA 36 (2002) ("[Tlhe Bureau of Reclamation operates 348 reservoirs that provide
water for ten million acres of farmland and 31 million people... .But the BIA has never
finished an irrigation project.").
6. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 477-79.
7. Id. at 481-83.
8. Before the United States filed suit in United States v. Washington, 375 F. Supp. 2d
1050 (W.D. Wash. 2005), in 2001 to assert water rights on behalf of the Lumi Nation, the
last federal court litigation commenced by the United States appears to be United States v.
Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1979), filed in 1975.
9. Most litigation over Indian water rights now takes place in state courts pursuant to
the McCarran Amendment. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2000). See Scott B. McElroy & Jeff J. Davis,
Revisiting Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States -There Must Be a
Better Way, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 597, 61249 (1995) (summarizing proceedings in several states).
See infra Part III.
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significant amounts of water for use on Indian reservations, 10 although
recent settlements hold more promise." Most Indian tribes have not
quantified their reserved rights to water and potential tribal claims are
12
large.
This article briefly traces the erratic course of Indian law to
provide context for the treatment of Indian water rights. It then reviews
in some detail the legal framework of Indian reserved water rights,
including an analysis of the cases prosecuted by the United States prior
to the 1960s. The modem standards for measurement of Indian rights are
examined in detail, along with the recent trend toward settlements. The
article closes with recommendations designed to further settlement of
Indian water rights and improve the federal government's performance
as trustee.
II. INDIAN LAW AND POLICY
Federal policy respecting Indian affairs has vacillated greatly
over the course of U.S. history and the changes in course have had huge
adverse effects on the security of Indian rights.13 Through it all, however,
the United States has recognized the Indian tribes as possessing inherent
sovereign powers as governments, 14 as well as property rights as
landowners.' 5 And while the federal government has worked hard to
divest tribes of their property and some governmental powers, the
Supreme Court has stated that the United States "has charged itself with
moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust." 1 6 These
10. W. WATER POL'Y REV. ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST: THE CHALLENGE
FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 3-45 (1998).

11.
12.
13.

See COHEN, supra note 1,§ 19.05[2], at 1210-20.
See W. WATER POL'Y REV. ADVISORY COMM'N, supranote 10, at 3-48 to 3-50.
See generally COHEN, supra note 1, § 1; CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS,

TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1987)

[hereinafter WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS]. Professor Frickey sums it up well: "If the 'life
of the law' for legal formalists is logic and for legal pragmatists is experience, then federal
Indian law is for neither. More than any other field of public law, federal Indian law is
characterized by doctrinal incoherence and doleful incidents." Philip P. Frickey,
Adjudication and Its Discontents:Coherence and Conciliationin FederalIndian Law, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1754,1754 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
14. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455
U.S. 130 (1982).
15. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); United States v.
Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
16. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942). See also Reid Peyton
Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1213 (1975) (examining whether the trust responsibility itself creates legally enforceable
duties for the federal government).
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standards are manifest in rules of statutory interpretation holding that
"tribal property rights and sovereignty are preserved unless Congress's
intent to the contrary is clear and unambiguous." 17 Despite past efforts to
assimilate Indians into mainstream society, modem statutes like the
Indian Reorganization Act 18 and the Indian Self-Determination Act 19
have bolstered the standing, independence, and capacity of tribal
20
governments in the United States.
Early nineteenth century rulings set the basic contours of the
federal-tribal relationship regarding the United States' view of the nature
of tribal land ownership and governmental status. In Johnson v.
M'Intosh,2' the Court reviewed a title contest between two parties
claiming title from the Illinois and Piankeshaw nations on the one hand
and the United States on the other. The Court noted that the Indian tribes
"were in rightful possession of the land they sold" to Johnson's
predecessors in 1773 and 1775. 22 According to the Court, however, the
discovering European Nations obtained "the sole right of acquiring the
soil from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it." 23 It therefore
followed that the conveyances made by the tribes in 1773 and 1775
without British Crown approval did not pass clear title to Johnson's
predecessors. 24 The title obtained by McIntosh from the United States, on
the other hand, was valid since the transactions between the tribal
nations and the United States comported with the Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1790,25 which made it illegal for state or private parties

17. COHEN, supra note 1, § 2.0211], at 120.
18. Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461479 (2000)).
19. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88
Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq. (2000)).
20. See WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 13, at 21; COHEN, supra note 1, §
1.05, at 84.
21. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
22. Id. at 571-72.
23. Id. at 573.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives, as
occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and
claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a
power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants
have been understood by all, to convey a title to the grantees, subject only
to the Indian right of occupancy. The history of America, from its
discovery to the present day, proves, we think, the universal recognition of
these principles.
Id. at 574.
24. Id. at 592-94.
25. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137. The Act was temporary but was continued
in various forms and is now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000).
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to acquire Indian land without the consent of the United States. 26 The
statute established a federal monopoly with respect to acquisition of
Indian land and ensured that Indian land was protected (in law at least)
from non-Indian encroachment. Thus, no land in the United States was
legally available for non-Indian occupation until tribal aboriginal rights
of use and occupancy were extinguished pursuant to transactions
approved by treaty or federal statute. 27 The requirement of federal
approval of transfers of land and water implies a duty to protect Indian
aboriginal lands that is at the foundation of the federal-tribal
relationship. 28 "Unquestionably, it has been the policy of the federal
government from the beginning to respect the Indian right of occupancy,
which could only be interfered with or determined by the United
States."'29
In Worcester v. Georgia,30 a case rejecting Georgia's assertion of
criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian present within the Cherokee
Nation, Chief Justice Marshall explained the sovereign status of Indian
tribes under international and federal law in the following terms:
The Indian nations had always been considered as
distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the
soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of
that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them
from intercourse with any other European potentate than

26. Id. § 4. See COHEN, supra note 1, § 15.06. In Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,
414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974), the Court affirmed the rights of Indian tribes to sue in federal court
for recovery of land ceded to third parties in violation of the Act. For the latest in this longrunning litigation, see City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005). See also
Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 401 F. Supp. 2d 219, 222 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) ("A
district court should not permit the taking of a sovereign nation's land against its will by
foreclosure or any other means, without the express approval of the United States
Government. In this country such an extraordinary remedy -taking a sovereign nation's
land against its will-has never been legally sanctioned.").
27. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234, 240 (1985).
28. Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust
Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1495-98. Professor Wood notes that "[tihe vast
cessions of land by the native peoples were premised on federal promises that the native
peoples could continue their way of life on homelands of smaller size, free from the
intrusions of the majority society." Id. at 1496. As discussed below, reservations of water
have been routinely implied in order to fulfill these promises. See infra Part II.B.
29. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941) (quoting Cramer v.
United States, 261 U.S. 219, 227 (1923)). The Court also noted that the Indian "'right of
occupancy is considered as sacred as the fee simple of the whites."' Id. (quoting Mitchel v.
United States, 34 U.S. 711, 746 (1835)).
30. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
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the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region
claimed....
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force,
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter,
but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of [C]ongress.
The whole intercourse between the United States and this
nation is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the
31
government of the United States.
The recognition of the tribes' sovereignty and ownership of the territory
they occupied in the early days of the United States established the legal
basis for modem claims to ownership and governmental power over
water.32 In these formative years of the nation, Congress passed many
laws governing Indian affairs pursuant to the Indian Commerce
Clause. 33
Treaty negotiations with western tribes took place as the United
States gained new territory from foreign nations. 34 Between 1778 and
1871, the United States negotiated and ratified 367 treaties with Indian
tribes.35 The federal government intended the treaties to further peaceful
31. Id. at 559-61. Earlier, the Court had ruled that the Cherokee Nation was not a
foreign nation entitled to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to challenge
Georgia state laws purporting to regulate the Nation. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
1, 20 (1831). For criticism of the Discovery Doctrine, see Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra
of FederalIndian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian
Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219. For an argument that federal law does not apply to
Indian tribes absent their consent, see Robert Odawi Porter, The Inapplicabilityof American
Law to the Indian Nations,89 IOWA L. REv. 1595 (2004).
32. The right of occupancy when confirmed included ownership of all resources in the
tribal territory. United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For a scholarly critique of the notion that the Indian
Commerce Clause gives the federal government power to govern tribes, see Robert N.
Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indians, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 133 (2002)
("The Indian Commerce Clause grants broad Indian affairs powers, but the power is broad
vis-A-vis the states; it does not affect the powers or sovereignty of the Indian tribes."). In
United States v. Lara, the Supreme Court repeated the conventional view when it described
federal power over Indian affairs as plenary and exclusive and as rooted in
"preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any Federal Government." 541 U.S. 193,
200-01 (2004).
34. See COHEN, supra note 1, §§ 1.03[5]-[6], at 60-69.
35. FRANCIs PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL
ANOMALY 1 [hereinafter PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES] (1994). Felix Cohen noted

that, "[u]ntil the last decade of the treaty-making period, terms familiar to modern
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relations with the tribes and, perhaps more importantly, obtain cessions
of vast areas for land hungry settlers.3 6 The federal removal policy,
which called for voluntary relocation of Indian tribes from the eastern
states to the Oklahoma Territory and other parts of the West, aided those
efforts. 37 In exchange, the United States agreed to recognize permanent
homelands, or reservations, and sometimes recognized reservations of
off-reservation hunting and fishing rights. 38 Most of the "permanent"
homelands promised in treaties, however, were dramatically reduced in
size when non-Indian settlers sought land previously "guaranteed" by
treaty. 39 In negotiation or implementation of treaties, tribes frequently
alleged fraud on the part of the United States,4° but tribes with such
complaints were left to appeal to Congress.41 None of the treaties or

international diplomacy were used in the Indian treaties" and "[miany provisions show the
international status of the Indian tribes, through clauses relating to war, boundaries,
passports, extradition, and foreign relations." FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW § 3[A], at 39 (1942).
36. See, e.g., Act of June 5, 1850, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 437 (authorizing the President "to
appoint one or more commissioners to negotiate treaties with the several Indian tribes in
the Territory of Oregon, for the extinguishment of their claims to lands lying west of the
Cascade Mountains; and if found expedient and practicable, for their removal east of said
mountains; also, for obtaining their assent and submission to the existing laws regulating
trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes in the other Territories and of the United

States").
37. Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411. See COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.03[4][a], at 54
(noting that by 1850 the majority of Indian tribes had been removed from the eastern
states); FRANCES PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN

INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS:

INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE AmTS, 1790-1834, at 224-28 (1962).
38. See, e.g., Treaty with the Chippewa, 1837, July 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 536, construed in
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) and Treaty with the
Nisqualli, Puyallup, Etc. 1854 (Treaty of Medicine Creek), Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132,
construed in Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979).
39. For example,
in September 1874, General Sheridan sent instructions to Brigadier General
Alfred H. Terry, Commander of the Department of Dakota, at Saint Paul,
directing him to use force to prevent companies of prospectors from
trespassing on the Sioux Reservation. At the same time, Sheridan let it be
known that he would "give a cordial support to the settlement of the Black
Hills," should Congress decide to "open up the country for settlement, by
extinguishing the treaty rights of the Indians."
United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1980). Not long thereafter, in 1877,
Congress took the Black Hills through an "agreement" that amounted to a taking of the
tribe's recognized title to the land for which compensation was required under the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 378-86,423-24.
40. See, e.g., PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES, supra note 35, at 173-74 (1994);
COHEN, supranote 1, § 1.03 [4] [a], at 52-54.
41. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.04[2][a], at
413-14.
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agreements spoke directly to water rights, but many provisions made it
42
clear that access to and use of water was critical to the tribes.
Treaties of the 1850s contained provisions authorizing the
breakup of tribal lands into individual "allotments." 43 The objective was
"to extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and force
the assimilation of Indians into the society at large." 44 This policy
culminated with adoption of the General Allotment Act 45 and reduced
the Indian land base from 156 million acres in 1881 to approximately 48
million acres in 1934.46 It resulted in a checkerboard pattern of land
ownership within reservations, which introduced vexing jurisdictional
problems 47 and great complexity in determining the water rights of nonIndians who acquired allotted lands from Indians. 4 Congress ended
treaty-making with tribes in 1871 when the House of Representatives
refused to appropriate funds to implement existing treaties unless the
Senate agreed that it would no longer participate in the treaty process
with tribes. 49 The statute provided, however, that "no obligation of any
treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe
42. See, e.g., Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 266-71 (2001) (negotiations over
reservation boundaries centered on the inclusion of parts of Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St.
Joe River); Treaty with the Chippewa, Bois Fort Band, 1866, art. 3, Apr. 7, 1866, 14 Stat. 765,
(reservation to include Nett Lake and mouth of Deer Creek).
43. Treaty with the Omaha, art. 6, Mar. 16, 1854, 10 Stat. 1043; Treaty with the
Dwimish, Suqu~mish, and other allied and subordinate Tribes of Indians in Washington
Territory, art. 7, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927.
44. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. 251, 254 (1992). See D.S. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN
LANDS (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973); Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian
PropertyRights and the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1559 (2001).
45. General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (formerly codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-333). The Dawes Act provided authority for the President to divide
communal tribal lands into individual parcels to be held by tribal members. For a period of
25 years, the federal government protected these "allotments" from taxation and tribal
members could not sell them without the consent of the Secretary of the Interior. Id. § 5. At
the conclusion of the 25-year period, the Secretary of the Interior could extend the
restrictions on alienation or convey the land to the Indian in fee simple status. Id. Further,
the government could declare the remaining lands on an allotted reservation "surplus" and
return them to the public domain. Id. See generally COHEN, supranote 1, § 16.03.
46. COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.04, at 78-79.
47. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of
Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995).
48. In United States v. Powers, the Supreme Court recognized that allotments included
reserved water rights. 305 U.S. 527 (1939). For a survey of issues related to water rights of
allottees and subsequent owners, see COHEN, supranote 1, § 19.03[8].
49. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000)).
The United States continued to negotiate agreements with Indian tribes that were then
ratified by Congress.

Spring 2006]

INDIAN WATER RIGHTS

407

prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired."50 The
Act manifested the shift of the balance of power between tribes and the
federal government and the federal domination of treaty negotiations
since the 1830s.
With the adoption of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) in
1934,51 Congress returned to earlier policies supporting the protection of
the Indian land base. The IRA "halted further allotments and extended
indefinitely the existing periods of trust applicable to already allotted
(but not yet fee-patented) Indian lands." 52 Today, Indian land holdings
are put at 56 million acres, with tribes owning approximately 45 million
and 11 million held in the form of individual trust or restricted fee
allotments.53 Less than 20 years after passage of the IRA, Congress
adopted a resolution calling for the "termination" of the federal-tribal
relationship with certain Indian tribes, which interrupted this return to
support of tribal self-government and a secure Indian land base.5 4
Although the termination period quickly fell into disfavor, it resulted in
the end of the government-to-government relationship between the
United States and about 100 federally recognized Indian tribes and
transferred jurisdiction over those tribes to the states. 55 President Nixon
repudiated the termination policy and ushered in an era supportive of
the federal-tribal relationship when he announced the policy of "selfdetermination without termination."-% Congress followed suit with the
Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975,7 which allows for the transfer of
federal programs from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the tribes.5 8 In a
host of other statutes and administrative actions, the United States today
encourages and supports tribal governmental institutions. 59 However,

50. Id.
51. Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2000)). See COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.05.
52. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. 251, 255 (1992).
53. COHEN, supra note 1, § 15.01, at 965, § 16.04[a], at 1048.
54. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953) (directing the Secretary of the
Interior to recommend tribes for termination). See COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 94-95.
55. See COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.06.
56. H.R. Doc. No. 91-363 (1970).
57. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88
Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq. (2000)).
58. COHEN, supra note 1, §§ 5.03[4], 22.02.
59. See, e.g., Indian Tribal Regulatory Reform and Business Development Act of 2000,
25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(6) (2000) ("[T]he United States has an obligation to guard and preserve
the sovereignty of Indian tribes in order to foster strong tribal governments, Indian selfdetermination, and economic self-sufficiency among Indian tribes."); Exec. Order No.
13,175. 3 C.F.R. § 13175 (2000), reprinted in 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2000) (affirming the federal
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actions to fully ameliorate the effect of past policies have not
accompanied the modem shift in support of tribal rights. For example,
the IRA ended the allotment and assimilation era, but the non-Indians
and their transferees who acquired much of the 100 million acres of land
removed from tribal ownership remain within Indian reservations. 60 The
allotments remaining in individual Indian ownership are frequently held
61
by hundreds of individuals as tenants in common.
When Congress has addressed the nature of tribal land
ownership and governance, the policies have generally been clear and
national in scope. 62 Congress never, however, addressed water resource
development by Indians on tribal lands in any comprehensive manner. 63
Indeed, the United States aggressively enabled non-Indians to use the
same water that was necessary for tribal use and protection of treaty
resources. 64 While the government's duty to protect Indian water rights
is clear,65 a variety of circumstances have frustrated attempts at
consistent adherence to the federal trust obligation. 66 The dramatic turns
in federal policy generally took no account of Indian water rights. 67 The
treaties and agreements by which tribes ceded their aboriginal lands,
however, implicitly guaranteed Indian access to and use of water for
new pursuits such as agriculture, as well as traditional hunting, fishing,
and gathering. Until significant settlement occurred in the arid west,

trust responsibility to Indian tribes). An exhaustive discussion of federal programs can be
found in COHEN, supranote 1, § 22.
60. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 13, at 21-23; Royster, supra note 47, at
30.
61. See COHEN, supra note 1, § 16.05[21[c][iiil, at 1068; Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234,
237-39 (1997).
62. The major exception is termination, which was a national policy implemented on a
tribe-by-tribe basis for a brief period in the 1950s. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
63. See W. WATER POL'Y REV. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 10, at 3-47 (1998) (noting
the lack of funding to construct and maintain seventy-seven Indian irrigation projects). See
also MCCOOL, supra note 5, at 20-22 (describing the tribes' use of only a small fraction of
water rights because of the failure by Congress to adequately fund water projects);
BURTON, supra note 4, at 23.
64.

See WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN, supra note 4, at 219-59 (1992)

(discussing the role of the Bureau of Reclamation and other federal agencies in promoting
out-of-stream uses of water).
65. See Wood, supra note 28, at 1513-14.
66. See Juliano, supra note 3.
67. One exception is the General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, which requires the
Secretary of the Interior to secure water for irrigation by individual allottees. 24 Stat. 388,
390, 25 U.S.C. § 381 (2000). See United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 532 (1939); Sol. Op. M.
3692 (Mar. 30, 1995), at 7. See also supranote 45.
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however, there was little competition for water. That changed by the late
nineteenth century. 68
III. INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
A. Origins
The landmark case involving federal reserved water rights in
general and Indian reserved water rights in particular is Winters v. United
States.69 In Winters, the Court construed a congressionally ratified
agreement between the Indians of the Fort Belknap Reservation and the
United States.70 In the agreement, the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine
Bands of Indians surrendered most of their larger reservation and
retained a much smaller reservation adjacent to the Milk River in
Montana.71 The 1888 agreement recited that the reservation set aside in
1874 was "wholly out of proportion to the number of Indians occupying"
that reservation "and greatly in excess of their present or prospective
wants." 72 The preamble to the agreement concluded by stating that the
"Indians are desirous of disposing of so much thereof as they do not
require in order to obtain the means to enable them to become selfsupporting, as a pastoral and agricultural people... ."73 Of course, the
purpose of the agreement was not simply to provide for the Indians, but
also to clear the way for the settlement of the West by whites.74 NonIndians who had settled upstream of the reservation claimed paramount
rights to use water from the Milk River based on the prior appropriation
doctrine. 75
68.
See JOHN SHURTS, INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: THE WINTERS DOCTRINE IN ITS
SOCIAL AND LEGAL CoNTEXrT, 1880s-1930s (2000).

69. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). See SHURTS, supra note 68, at 15-157 (containing an exhaustive
analysis of Winters); McCOOL, supra note 5, at 9-14 (discussing the history and legacy of
Winters).
70. Act of May 1, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113 (1889). As noted above, treaty-making
ended in 1871. See supranote 49.
71. The larger tract of land had been set aside for "the use and occupation of the Gros
Ventre, Piegan, Blood, Blackfoot, River Crow, and such other Indians as the President may,
from time to time see fit to locate thereon" in 1874. Act of Apr. 15, 1874, ch. 96, 18 Stat. 28;
SHURTS, supranote 68, at 17-18.
72. Pmbl., 25 Stat. at 113.
73. Id. The agreement also provided for reservations at Fort Peck, 25 Stat. at 116, Fort
Belknap, 25 Stat. at 124, and the Blackfeet Agency, 25 Stat. at 129.
74. See COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.03[6], at 64-69.
75. All of the western states in the continental United States follow some form of the
prior appropriation doctrine.
Under that doctrine, one acquires a right to water by diverting it from its
natural source and applying it to some beneficial use. Continued beneficial
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If the Indians were to be able to grow crops as contemplated by
the agreement creating the reservation, they would need water being
used by the non-Indians. The United States filed suit on behalf of the
tribes and claimed that Congress had reserved the water to fulfill the
purpose for establishing the reservation, i.e., to turn the Indians into
farmers and to serve as a homeland for the tribes. 76 In opposition, Henry
Winter argued that under the state law of prior appropriation the nonIndian use superceded any rights claimed by the United States. 77 The
trial court ruled in favor of the United States on the theory that the
agreement with the Indians was intended to reserve water to fulfill the
agricultural purposes set out in the ratified agreement and to provide
"permanent homes" for the Indians on the various reservations. 78 The
Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that
[tihe reservation was a part of a very much larger tract
which the Indians had the right to occupy and use, and
which was adequate for the habits and wants of a nomadic
and uncivilized people. It was the policy of the
government, it was the desire of the Indians, to change
those habits and to become a pastoral and civilized people.
If they should become such, the original tract was too
extensive; but a smaller tract would be inadequate without
a change of conditions. The lands were arid, and, without
irrigation, were practically valueless. And yet, it is
contended, the means of irrigation were deliberately given
up by the Indians and deliberately accepted by the
Government. 79

use of the water is required in order to maintain the right. In periods of
shortage, priority among confirmed rights is determined according to the
date of initial diversion.
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805 (1976) (footnote
omitted). See generally WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 12.02 (2001 Repl. ed.).
76. Bill
of Complaint at paras. 4,8, United States v. Anderson, No. 747 (D. Mont. filed
June 26, 1905). See also SHURTS, supra note 68, at 59-62 & nn.5-6.
77. SHURTS,supra note 68, at 72. Although the United States alleged in its pleadings
that Indian use actually preceded the non-Indian diversions, the evidence produced at the
hearing in the district court indicated that most of the actual tribal use of water had
commenced after the non-Indian appropriations. Id.
78. Id. at 72-74 & n.9 (quoting Anderson, No. 747, Memorandum Order (D. Mont. filed
Aug. 7, 1905)).
79. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
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The Supreme Court ruled that the federal government had the
power to exempt waters from appropriation under state water law, 80 and
that the United States and the Indians intended to reserve the waters of
the Milk River to fulfill the purposes of the agreement between the
Indians and the United States.81 The Court stated that, "ambiguities
occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians. And the
rule should certainly be applied to determine between two inferences,
one of which would support the purpose of the agreement and the other
impair or defeat it."82 When the question of federal power to reserve
83
water was next addressed by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California,
the Court rejected state objections based on the equal footing doctrine
and held that the reservation of water for federal or Indian purposes can
occur either before or after statehood. 84 While the cases involved implied
reservations of water to irrigate Indian reservation lands, Congress may
reserve water for federal purposes without a corresponding reservation
85
of land.
80. "The power of the government to reserve the waters and exempt them from
appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be." Winters, 207 U.S. at 577
(citing United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 702 (1899)); United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). Indian and federal rights to water may be expressly
reserved as well as implied. See, e.g., An Act to Establish the El Malpais National
Monument § 509, 16 U.S.C. § 460uu-49 (2000) ("Congress expressly reserves to the United
States the minimum amount of water required to carry out the purposes [of this Act].");
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. 96-487, § 303(7)(B), 94 Stat. 2371,
2392-93 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 668dd (2000)) ("The purposes for which the Yukon
Delta National Wildlife Refuge is established and shall be managed include - (i) to
conserve fish and wildlife populations and habitats in their natural diversity including, but
not limited to, shorebirds, seabirds, whistling swans, emperor, white-fronted and Canada
geese, black brant and other migratory birds, salmon, muskox, and marine
mammals;... [and] (iv) to ensure, to the maximum extent practicable and in a manner
consistent with the purposes set forth in paragraph (i), water quality and necessary water
quantity within the refuge."). For an example of expressly reserved Indian water rights, see
Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 813, art. 8, 31 Stat. 672, 674 (ratifying an agreement with Indians at
the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho: "The water from streams on that portion of the
reservation now sold which is necessary for irrigating on land actually cultivated and in
use shall be reserved for the Indians now using the same, so long as said Indians remain
where they now live").
81. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
82. Id. See also COHEN, supra note 1, § 2.02 (discussing canons of construction of Indian
law).
83. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
84. Id. at 597-98.
85. In an exhaustive analysis of federal water rights, the U.S. Department of Justice's
Office of Legal Counsel determined that the power to reserve waters for federal use does
not require a federal set-azdi"e of land, but that "the Supremacy Clause provides Congress
with ample power, when coupled with the commerce power, the Property Clause, or other
grants of federal power, to supersede state law." Federal "Non-Reserved" Water Rights, 6
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The question of whether the United States or the tribe did the
reserving deserves further treatment. It is generally accepted that the
priority date of a reserved water right under the Winters doctrine is the
date of establishment of the reservation, 86 based on the theory that it was
the United States that did the reserving for a use not previously engaged
in by the tribe.8 7 There is, however, language in Winters indicating that it
was the tribe that did the reserving. 88 If the tribe was reserving water it
already owned, it would follow that any priority date should be linked
to the term of the tribe's aboriginal occupancy of an area, i.e., time
immemorial. In United States v. Winans,89 the Supreme Court considered
the rights of Yakama Tribe members to cross privately owned land in
order to exercise off-reservation treaty rights to fish at usual and
accustomed stations. The tribes had ceded most of their land to the
United States in exchange for exclusive rights to occupy a smaller
reservation, along with "the right of taking fish at all usual and
accustomed places, in common with citizens of the territory." 90 The
private landowners argued that the "in common with" language meant
that the Indians should be subject to exclusion just as non-Indians could
be excluded from private property. 9' After all, they argued, their patents

Op. Off. Legal Counsel 328, 363 (1982). The opinion "still expresses executive branch
policy." John D. Leshy, Water Rights for New Federal Land Conservation Programs:A Turn-ofthe-Century Evaluation, 4 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 271, 288 (2001). This is an important point
to consider when evaluating the continued existence of Indian reserved rights on those
reservations where significant amounts of land have passed out of Indian ownership
pursuant to allotment and surplus land acts. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
Simply because much of the land has been transferred out of Indian ownership does not
mean that water is no longer necessary to provide for tribal needs other than irrigation.
86. Thus, a reservation established by treaty in 1868 would have a reserved right with
an 1868 priority date, and rights established prior to that date under state law would have
priority over the Indian reserved right.
87. See COHEN supra note 1, § 19.02, at 1173.
88. "The Indians had command of the lands and the waters,-command of all their
beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, 'and grazing roving herds of stock,' or turned to
agriculture and the arts of civilization. Did they give up all this?" Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908). In its brief to the Court, the United States stated that the Indians
"retained or were granted by the United States the right to divert and use for domestic,
irrigation and other beneficial purposes so much of the Milk River as was sufficient to meet
their needs and to carry out the objects and purposes sought to be effected by said
agreement." Brief for the United States at 12, Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908)
(No. 158). See WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 37.01(b)(2), at 37-13 (2004 Repl. ed.) (noting the
ambiguity).
89. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
90. Treaty between the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians art. 3, June 9,
1855, 12 Stat. 951, 953.
91. The right to exclude is often cited as one of the principal rights of a property
owner. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY § 1.2.1 (2d ed. 2005).
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from the United States government said nothing about an easement for
access to Indian fishing sites on the now private land. The Court rejected
the argument, noting that "[t]he reservations were in large areas of
territory, and the negotiations were with the tribe. They reserved rights,
however, to every individual Indian, as though named therein. They
imposed a servitude upon every piece of land as though described
therein." 92 The Court reasoned that the reserved easement followed from
the principle that Indian treaties are not "a grant of rights to the Indians,
93
but a grant of right from them,-a reservation of those not granted."
Any surrender of such rights must be clear and express. Thus, under the
Winans rationale, courts need not look to congressional action conferring
water rights on a tribe if the tribe was the original owner of an area.
Instead, the inquiry looks to whether the tribe surrendered such rights
by treaty or through other congressional action.94 The Ninth Circuit used
this reasoning in evaluating the Klamath Tribe's water rights.
[T]he 1864 Treaty [with the Klamaths] is a recognition of
the Tribe's aboriginal water rights and a confirmation to the
Tribe of a continued water right to support its hunting and
fishing lifestyle on the Klamath Reservation.
Such water rights necessarily carry a priority date of time
immemorial. The rights were not created by the 1864
Treaty, rather, the treaty confirmed the continued existence
of these rights.95
Despite the language in Winters indicating that it was the tribe
that did the reserving, 96 courts and commentators (and the United States
as trustee) generally assert that Winters rights pertain to uses that are
non-aboriginal in nature and have a priority date as of the establishment
of the reservation. 97 In some cases, the priority date may not be the date
92.

Winans, 198 U.S. at 381. The Court found that
[t]he right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was a part of larger
rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a
shadow of impediment, and which were not much less necessary to the
existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.

Id.
93. Id.
94. COHEN, supra note 1, § 2.02[1], at 120 ("[Tlribal property rights and sovereignty are
preserved unless Congress's intent to the contrary is clear and unambiguous.").
95. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252
(citing Washington v. Washington State Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 67881 (1979)).
96. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
97. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963) (characterizing Winters as a case
where the government had reserved water for Indians as of the date of the agreement
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of the actual set-aside of the land, but when Congress set in motion the
events leading to the withdrawal. 98 By definition, the reserved right's
existence does not depend on putting water to actual use as in the prior
appropriation system 99 and is not subject to the state law doctrine of
°°
forfeiture for non-use9
With such a solid foundation set nearly 100 years ago, one might
think that most issues surrounding the existence and measure of Indian
reserved water rights would be settled by now. They are not. 01 The
Winters case involved an action for an injunction against non-Indian
diversions and did not determine the full quantity of water resources
reserved for the Indians of the Fort Belknap Reservation. It also did not
touch upon the reservation of water for uses other than agriculture, such
as domestic uses, or additional uses necessary to make Indian
reservations suitable as permanent homelands for the tribes. These and
other issues are the subject of much protracted litigation with little
dispositive resolution. The remainder of this article explores these issues
in greater detail, along with the role played by the United States in the
efforts to quantify, protect, and utilize water resources.
B. Establishment and Measure of Indian Reserved Rights
1. The Era of Open-Ended Decrees
In the few cases after Winters and before 1963, lower courts
generally adhered to the practice endorsed in Winters of enjoining
interference with extant tribal uses while leaving the door left open for
expansion of the reserved right as tribal needs increased. For example, in
Conrad Investment Co. v. United States'0 2 the court of appeals considered a
dispute very similar to that in Winters, but went further than simply
setting aside the reservation); United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1984);
COHEN, supra note 1, § 19.0313], at 1179.
98. United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 338-39 (9th Cir. 1939);
State ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d 235 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that date of
peace treaty set priority date even though land was not withdrawn until 20 years later);
COHEN, supra note 1, § 19.03[3], at 1179 n.82.
99. Id. § 19.01[1], at 1168-69.
100. Id. § 19.0311], at 1174-76. See also United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 309 F. Supp.
2d 1245, 1248 (D. Nev. 2004), affd sub nom. United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist.,
429 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2005); United States ex rel. Ray v. Hibner 27 F.2d 909, 912 (D. Idaho
1928) ("but the failure of the Indians to use their water will not cause either an
abandonment or a forfeiture of their rights thereto").
101. See Judith V. Royster, A Primeron Indian Water Rights: More Questions Than Answers,
30 TULSA L.J. 61 (1994).
102. 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908). The complaint in Conrad was actually filed six months
before the Winters case. Shurts, supra note 68, at 61-62.
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enjoining non-Indian interference with current tribal uses on the
Blackfeet Indian Reservation. Instead, the court quantified the Indian
rights at the level of existing use and explicitly provided the tribe with
leave to seek additional quantities should the tribe's needs increase:
[W]henever the needs and requirements of the complainant
[the United States on behalf of the tribe] for the use of the
waters of Birch creek for irrigating and other useful
purposes upon the reservation exceed the amount of water
reserved by the decree for that purpose, the complainant
may apply to the court for a modification of the decree.
This is entirely in accord with complainant's rights as
adjudged by the decree. Having determined that the
Indians on the reservation have a paramount right to the
waters of Birch creek, it follows that the permission given
to the defendant to have the excess over the amount of
water specified in the decree should be subject to
modification, should the conditions on the reservation at
any time require such modification. 103
In United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation District, 104 the court
concluded that the Treaty with the Yakama'05 included a reservation of
water "not limited to the use of the Indians at any given date
but.. .extend to the ultimate needs of the Indians as those needs and
requirements should grow to keep pace with the development of Indian
agriculture upon the reservation." 1°6 The United States brought suit on
07
behalf of an individual allotment owner in Skeem v. United States,
which involved a treaty with an explicit provision protecting actual
Indian use at the time the treaty was signed.1 8 The court agreed with the
United States that reserved rights should be implied for future uses in
addition to the actual uses expressly protected by the treaty.1° 9 In United

103. ConradInv. Co., 161 F. at 835.
104. United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 988 (1957). For a description of the Secretary of the Interior's apparent breach of
trust to the Yakama Nation, see infra note 202.
105. Treaty between the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians, June 9, 1855,
12 Stat. 951, 12 Stat. 951 (June 9, 1855).
106. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d at 327.
107. 273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921).
108. Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 813, § 1, 31 Stat. 672, art. 8 (1900) (ratifying "an agreement
with the Indians of the Fort Hall Indian Reservation in Idaho" that had been reached on
Feb. 5, 1898).
109. Skeem, 273 F. at 94-95.
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States ex rel. Ray v. Hibner, the court described claims made on behalf of
individual Indians in the following terms:" 0
The contention of the government as guardian for the
Indian wards of the land allotted to them, is that, under the
treaties and acts relating to the reservation, its wards have a
superior right to the stream, which does not depend upon
occupancy or possession of their lands, and which the
defendants could not defeat or impair by first
appropriating the water and actually applying it to their
beneficial use, and that the Indian lands are entitled to a
continuous flow through the entire year of a sufficient
amount of water from Toponce creek for domestic and
irrigation purposes for such portion of their lands as are
susceptible to irrigation, regardless of whether or not they
have placed under cultivation and actually irrigated all of
such lands."'
Thus, by the middle of the twentieth century it was clear that
Indian reservations with an agricultural purpose included water rights
sufficient for irrigation and that the amount of water with a date of
reservation priority would increase as tribal needs increased." 2 This
made perfect sense, since one could not ascertain the future needs of the
tribes with certainty at any given time. On the other hand, it left many
rights acquired under the prior appropriation system on shaky ground,
3
since the potential increase in Indian use could not be predicted."
The court in United States v. Walker River Irrigation District"4
foreshadowed modem concerns with large potential claims of Indian
tribes under the Winters doctrine. Although there were irrigable tribal

110. 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928).
111. Id. at 910-11.
112. The same policy was followed with respect to lands allotted to individuals under
the Dawes Act. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 532 (When allotments of land were
made, "the right to use some portion of tribal waters essential for cultivation passed to the
owners."); Skeem, 273 F. 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1921) (water rights not lost when allotments leased
to third parties). For a discussion of the allotment policy, see supra text accompanying notes
43-50.
113. See Reid Peyton Chambers & John E. Echohawk, Implementing the Winters Doctrine
of Indian Reserved Water Rights: Producing Indian Water and Economic Development Without
Injuring Non-Indian Water Users?, 27 GONZ. L. REv. 447, 448 (1992) (The reserved rights
doctrine "strikes widespread fear into the hearts of non-Indian water users."). See also
Martha C. Franks, The Uses of the PracticablyIrrigableAcreage Standardin the Quantificationof
Reserved Water Rights, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 549 (1991) (discussing the limitations of PIA
methodology).
114. 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
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lands on the Walker River Paiute Reservation in the amount of
"approximately 10,000 acres," the court decreed enough water to irrigate
only 2100 acres-26.25 cubic feet per second. 115 The United States had
requested that 150 cubic feet per second be awarded -enough to irrigate
all 10,000 irrigable acres on the reservation. 116 The district court rejected
the United States' claim on the theory that executive order reservations
did not carry an implied reservation of water.117 When the United States
objected to the court's holding and asked for reconsideration, the district
court was frank in stating its view of the equities involved in the matter:
Briefly, the facts, as disclosed by the evidence and narrated
in this court's opinion in 11 F. Supp. 158, show that, after
the establishment of the reservation in 1859 (then and
thereafter the Indians being at war with the whites),
commencing in 1860 the whites acquired title from the
United States to lands above the Indian Reservation,
bordering on and adjacent to the Walker river and its
tributaries; that they also acquired water by prior
appropriation for a beneficial use, and actually irrigated
and reclaimed such lands; that they have enjoyed
undisputed and undisturbed possession of such lands and
such water rights for more than 50 years; that to dispossess
them now would bring ruin to long-established settlers,
and return to waste the lands which they, by their industry
and with the acquiescence of the government, reclaimed
from the desert.
Under such facts and circumstances this court is not
moved to give a decree destroying the rights of the white
pioneers." 8
The court of appeals subsequently reversed the holding that the
Winters doctrine did not apply to executive order reservations and also
held that the priority date of the reservation was 1859, which was before
the United States actually promulgated the executive order creating the
reservation." 9 However, the court of appeals affirmed the award of only
enough water to irrigate 2,000 acres, without leave to increase the
allocation as tribal needs might change. The court concluded that "actual

115.
116.
1935).
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 335, 340.
United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 11 F. Supp. 158, 159, 162-63 (D. Nev.
Id. at 167.
United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 14 F. Supp 10, 11 (D.Nev. 1936).
United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d at 337-39.
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diversion and use" over 70 years demonstrated that additional water
would not be necessary to satisfy tribal needs. 120 The decision ratified the
district court's explicit statement of a desire to protect the "white
pioneers."1 21 This urge to protect existing non-Indian uses and to
accommodate non-Indian development planning lurks in the
background of every Indian reserved water rights case,1 22 and forms the
backdrop for most Indian water rights settlements.123 That same court of
appeals did not follow the Walker River approach in United States v.
Ahtanum IrrigationDistrict,'24 where the court noted that "[ilt is obvious
that the quantum [of reserved water] is not measured by the use being
made at the time the treaty reservation was made. The reservation was
not merely for present but for future use." 125 The court accordingly
rejected the suggestion that the present and future needs of the Yakama
reservation be determined by the Indian use as of 1908, which the nonIndian water users argued was a "reasonable time" under the Walker
River standard. 126 The second half of the twentieth century provided
some major changes respecting the substance and procedure for
determining Indian reserved water rights.
2. The Importance of Finality
In 1963, the Supreme Court decided Arizona v. California'27 and
announced a standard to measure the water required to satisfy present
and future needs of certain Indian tribes along the Colorado River. The
case began in 1952 when the State of Arizona invoked the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by suing the State of California and
seven of its public agencies over their respective rights to the waters of
the Colorado River and its tributaries. The United States intervened in
the case to assert reserved rights for various non-Indian federal
reservations and on behalf of Indian tribes. Just as it had done in the
Walker River case, the federal government claimed enough water for all
120. Id.
121. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 14 F. Supp. at 11.
122. See MCCOOL, supra note 5, at 36-39. See also Byers v. Wa-Wa-Ne, 169 P. 121, 127-28
(Or. 1917) (no reserved rights for lands that were not arid and purportedly did not need
irrigation). The precedential value of Byers was rejected by the Solicitor of the Department
of the Interior on the ground that the state court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the Indian
water rights. Letter from Solicitor John D. Leshy to Martha Pagel, Oregon Director of Water
Resources (Feb. 10, 2000).
123. Id. See also Chambers & Echohawk, supra note 113, at 467-70.
124. 236 F.2d 321, 327 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957).
125. Ahtanum IrrigationDist., 236 F.2d at 326.
126. Id. at 328.
127. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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the arable lands capable of irrigation. 128 The Supreme Court agreed with
the United States that a formula for a once-and-for-all determination of
the quantum of Indian rights was appropriate. 129 Special Master
Rifkind's Report to the Court explained some options for measuring the
tribal reserved rights:
One possibility would be to adopt an open-end decree,
simply stating that each Reservation may divert at any
particular time all the water reasonably necessary for its
agricultural and related uses as against those who
appropriated water subsequent to its establishment.
However, such a limitless claim would place all junior
water rights in jeopardy of the uncertain and the
unknowable. Financing of irrigation districts would be
severely hampered if investors were faced with the
possibility that expanding needs on an Indian Reservation
130
might result in a reduction of the project's water supply.
The Master rejected the argument that Indians should be
required to obtain water pursuant to state law, 131 as well as the states'
argument that the court should base a water right award on the
132
prediction of the ultimate needs of the Indians on a given reservation.
He concluded that the United States intended the reservation to be the
permanent home of the Indians with enough water to satisfy the future
as well as the present needs of the tribe. 133 The Supreme Court agreed
with Special Master Rifkind and adopted the "practicably irrigable
acreage" (PIA) standard to determine the quantity of water reserved for
the Indian reservations involved in that case.'3 Thus, the era of open-

128. Id. at 596.
129. Id. at 600-01.
130. Report from Special Master Simon H. Rifkind, at 263-64, Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546 (1963) (No. 8, Original) (report filed as 364 U.S. 940 (1961)), available at
http://www.westernwaters.org/ (search for "Rifkind") [hereinafter Rifkind Report]. See
also Rebecca E. Wardlaw, Note, The IrrigableAcres Doctrine, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 375 (1975)
(describing alternative proposals to measure Indian water rights for present and future
needs).
131. Rifkind Report, supranote 130, at 261.
132. Id. at 264.
133. Id. at 262.
134. "We have concluded, as did the Master, that the only feasible and fair way by
which reserved water for the reservations can be measured is irrigable acreage." 373 U.S. at
601. Application of the PIA standard is discussed infra notes 155-168.
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ended decrees drew to a close and Indian reserved rights would be
135
determined on a once-and-for-all time basis in most future litigation.
In 1983, the Court reemphasized the importance of determining
a fixed amount of water when it rejected claims by the United States and
tribes to water for lands omitted from the claims made in the 1963
proceeding. The Court noted that "[a] major purpose of this litigation,
from its inception to the present day, has been to provide the necessary
assurance to states of the Southwest and to various private interests, of
the amount of water they can anticipate to receive from the Colorado
River system." 136 Other language in the Court's opinion clearly implied
that the United States and tribes should consider themselves fortunate.
The Court noted that, "[tihe standard for quantifying the reserved water
rights [in Arizona 1] was also hotly contested by the States, who argued
that the Master adopted a much too liberal measure." 137 In Nevada v.
United States,138 the Court rejected efforts by the United States and the
Pyramid Lake Paiutes to re-open the Orr Ditch decree in which the
federal government had failed to assert all tribal claims. Despite the
existence of a clear conflict of interest on the part of the United States, the
Court held that principles of res judicata precluded either the tribe or the
139
United States from asserting a claim for water for the tribal fisheries.
The foregoing cases made it clear that tribes were entitled to
water under the reserved rights doctrine and that once generally
asserted in litigation, there would be but one opportunity to establish the
measure of the right for all time. The latter fact has caused many tribes to
be reluctant to assert their rights in litigation based on fear that the
litigation climate is hostile to tribal interests, or sometimes on the basis
that it is simply inappropriate to measure and divide such a critical
cultural resource. 14° Parties would soon invoke Termination era
135. In some cases, the parties have stipulated to litigate more narrow issues. See, e.g,
United States v. Washington, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (litigation limited to
dispute over groundwater ownership on limited portion of reservation). There is no statute
or Supreme Court ruling that mandates a once-and-for-all quantification, but the reasons
underlying adoption of the McCarran Amendment make it the preferred outcome for at
least the state and private parties. See infra Part IV.
136. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605,620 (1983).
137. Id. at 617. In the latest iteration of this case, the Supreme Court held that the
Quechan tribe of the Fort Yuma Reservation could assert additional claims for lands within
reservations with disputed boundaries at the time of the 1963 proceeding. Arizona v.
California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000). A final settlement of the claims was lodged with the Court
on February 24, 2006, and would conclude this long-running litigation.
138. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
139. 463 U.S. at 142-44. For an insightful analysis of the case, see Juliano, supranote 3, at
1341-55.
140. See McCool, supranote 5, at 75-76.
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legislation to permit the involuntary adjudication of Indian water rights
in state courts.
IV. LITIGATION AFTER 1963
In the Termination era of the 1950s,14 1 Congress adopted the

McCarran Amendment,142 which waived the United States' immunity
from suit and thus provided states with authority to adjudicate federal
water rights.143 The Supreme Court has held that the statute requires that
the adjudications be comprehensive, i.e., inclusive of the rights of all
owners on a given stream, in order for a state court to assert jurisdiction
over federal claims.44 General stream adjudications are huge
proceedings, as several experienced adjudicators write:
Modem general stream adjudications, most of which have
been filed since the 1970s, are characterized by their
enormity and longevity. These complex lawsuits are among
the largest civil proceedings ever litigated in state or federal
courts. For instance, 28,500 persons have filed more than
100,000 claims to water rights in the Arizona general stream
adjudications. Parties have filed over 150,000 claims for
water rights in Idaho's Snake River adjudication. Also, in
See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
The McCarran Amendment states,
Consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit
(1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or
other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears
that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring
water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange,
or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The
United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have
waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the
United States is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2)
shall be subject to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having
jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances: Provided,
That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States in
any such suit.
43 U.S.C. § 666 (2000 and Supp. 2005).
143. For a succinct history of the amendment, see John E. Thorson et al., Dividing
Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 355,
449-58 (2005).
144. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963). See also United States v. Dist. Ct. In & For Eagle
County, Colo., 401 U.S. 520 (1971); United States v. Puerto Rico, 287 F.3d 212 (1st Cir. 2002);
United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, Klamath Tribe v. Oregon,
516 U.S. 943 (1995).
141.
142.
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Montana, approximately 80,000 persons have filed 218,000
water rights claims in the statewide adjudication. 145
The cases are also expensive to litigate. One estimate put
the state's cost of attorneys' fees at $14 million for 12 years
of litigation in Wyoming's Big Horn River adjudication. 146
Although the statute on its face says nothing about state court
authority to adjudicate federal reserved rights, or Indian reserved water
rights, 147 courts have interpreted the McCarran Amendment to allow
states to assert jurisdiction over both federal' 48 and Indian reserved
water rights1 49 This is the case even in states that disclaimed jurisdiction
over Indian tribes in the enabling acts that paved their way for entry into
the Union. 50 While the Supreme Court upheld state court jurisdiction to
adjudicate Indian reserved rights, the Court cautioned that
our decision in no way changes the substantive law by
which Indian rights in state water adjudications must be
judged. State courts, as much as federal courts, have a
solemn obligation to follow federal law. Moreover, any
state court decision alleged to abridge Indian water rights
protected by federal law can expect to receive, if brought
for review before this Court, a particularized and exacting
scrutiny commensurate with the powerful federal interest
5
in safeguarding those rights from state encroachment.' '

145. Thorson et al., supra note 143, at 358-59 (footnotes omitted).
146. Chambers & Echohawk, supra note 113, at 456 n.54.
147. General rules of Indian law preclude the exercise of state regulatory or
adjudicatory jurisdiction over Indian tribes, their members and their property within
Indian country. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
148. United States v. Dist. Ct. in & for Eagle County, Colo., 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
149. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The
Colorado River Court also held that, while the Amendment does not deprive federal courts
of jurisdiction over Indian water rights cases, they should abstain from asserting
jurisdiction over water rights disputes when a state is asserting jurisdiction over the same
matter. Cf. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1252 (1984) (abstention not required when federal court has already substantially
proceeded to determination of merits of whether tribe has reserved rights). See also United
States v. Idaho ex rel. Dir., Idaho Dep't of Water Resources, 508 U.S. 1 (1993) (McCarran
Amendment waiver does not permit States to require federal government to pay exorbitant
state court filing fees).
150. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983). States may not join the
tribe itself in the state court adjudication, but tribes will be bound since the United States as
trustee may represent the tribe's interests in water. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S.
110 (1983).
151. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 571. Whether this is true remains to be seen.
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As a result of these rulings, state courts are at the forefront of the
effort to determine the nature and scope of federal and Indian reserved
water rights. 52 There are approximately 30 water rights adjudications
involving Indian water rights underway in the states of Washington,
Idaho, Oregon, Montana, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and
Arizona.153
The centerpiece of the substantive law for the measure of Indian
55
s4
water rights since the decision in Arizona v. Californial has been PIA.1
In the litigation over reserved right claims on the Big Horn River in
Wyoming the parties agreed that PIA consisted of "those acres

susceptible to sustained irrigation at reasonable costs."156 The
Wyoming Supreme Court recognized a substantial reserved right for the
tribes of the Wind River Reservation and the Supreme Court affirmed
the decision in a 4-4 vote. 5 7 In its brief to the Supreme Court in Wyoming

152. For a review of general stream adjudications in many of the western states, see
McElroy & Davis, supra note 9. McElroy and Davis, who are seasoned Indian water
litigators, write,
[Tihere are frequent indications that tribes, the United States, and the
states are weary of the fray and are beginning to question the incredible
outlay of resources required for such massive adjudications. For example,
in Arizona, the parties have struggled for the last ten to fifteen years just to
establish a procedure to deal with the complexities of the federal rights of
the United States and Indian tribes.
Id. at 600 (internal footnotes omitted). See also Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., State Water Politics
Versus an Independent Judiciary: The Coloradoand Idaho Experiences, 5 U. DENY. WATER L. REV.
122 (2001).
153. Brief of the United States in Response to the Skokomish Indian Tribe's Petition for
Additional Rehearing by the En Banc Panel or Full Court Review of the En Banc Opinion
Dated March 4, 2005 at 13 (Apr. 20, 2005), Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 401
F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2005), opinion superceded, 410 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 2005). As of 1989, the State
of New Mexico had "ten active stream adjudications involving the water rights of eighteen
Indian Tribes and Pueblos and approximately 20,000 non-Indian claimants." Brief of the
State of New Mexico as Amicus Curiae, at 1-2, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 938
(1989) (No. 88-309). Since then, the Jicarilla Apache Tribe's claims were settled by federal
legislation, Pub. L. 102-441, 106 Stat. 2237 (1992), and the Mescalero Apache Tribe's claims
were finally decreed. New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Lewis, Nos. 20294 and 22600,
Judgment and Decree on Mandate (Chaves County Dist. Ct. June 3,2003).
154. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
155. As of 1990, the PIA standard was a central component in more than a dozen water
Indian rights cases in the western states. Brief for the United States at 48, n.46, Wyoming v.
United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989) (No. 88-309).
156. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 753 P.2d 76, 101 (Wyo. 1988), affd by equally divided court sub nom., Wyoming v.
United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989). See Richard B. Collins, The Future Course of the Winters
Doctrine, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 481, 484-85 (1985) (discussing PIA).
157. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989), affirming In re General Adjudication
of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988).
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v. United States, the Solicitor General pointed out that "the PIA standard
has generated significant expectations, reliance, and investment, both
legal and financial. For example, it forms the basis of proof in ongoing
litigation, or is the cornerstone of current settlement negotiations, in
virtually all western water rights quantifications." 158 There has been no
further word from the Court on the substance of the quantification of
Indian reserved water rights, although a draft opinion for the Court by
Justice O'Connor before her recusal advocated change in administration
of the PIA standard. 159
Some courts and commentators have criticized the PIA for
providing Indians with too much, or too little, water in various
circumstances. 160 The example of too much that is most often cited is In re
the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 161 in which the court recognized a reserved right to
approximately 500,000 acre feet of water to irrigate approximately
100,000 acres of the Wind River Reservation. 162 On the opposite pole is
State ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis, 163 in which the court awarded only 2322.4
acre feet of water for irrigation and other purposes to the Mescalero
Apache Tribe. 164 These criticisms seem questionable. The reservation of
water for the tribes of the Wind River Reservation seems consistent with
the application of the PIA standard applied in Arizona v. California, in
which the tribes were decreed 905,000 acre feet for 135,000 acres of
PIA.165 The small amount of water awarded to the tribe in State ex rel.

158. Brief of the United States, at 48-49, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989)
(case citations omitted).
159. See Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A MisplacedSensitivity: The DraftOpinions in
Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1997); David H. Getches, Conquering the
Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1573, 1640-41 (1996).
160. See COHEN, supra note 1, § 19.03[5][b]; Barbara A. Cosens, The Measure of Indian
Water Rights: The Arizona Homeland Standard, Gila River Adjudication, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J.
835, 843-44 (2002) (summarizing criticism from both tribes and states).
161. 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), affd by equally divided court sub nom., Wyoming v. United
States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
162. About 54,000 acres had been historically irrigated. 753 P.2d at 106-07.
163. 861 P.2d 235 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
164. The district court found that the Mescalero Apache reservation was intended to be
a permanent homeland for the tribe and that water was accordingly reserved for
"recreation, agriculture, domestic, stock, commercial, industrial and other uses for the 'arts
of civilization."' New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Lewis, Nos. 20294 and 22600, Final
Judgment at 9 (Chaves County Dist. Ct. July 11, 1989).
165. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1964). At the time of the Court's
judgment, the tribes were actually irrigating around 35,000 acres. See Chambers &
Echohawk, supra note 113, at 453.
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Martinez v. Lewis' 66 may have resulted from an overly stringent
application of the PIA doctrine, but the facts reveal a difficult case, and
167
the court did award water based on a variety of homeland purposes.
The PIA standard is the measure that the Supreme Court approved for
reservations with a clear agricultural purpose, and it should not be
disregarded because a particular court has a view that it provides "too
much."'168
While the Court in Arizona I noted that the United States
established various reservations as the tribes' permanent homes, the
Special Master awarded water only for PIA, with other uses subsumed in
that claim. 169 Many courts have taken a similar course and noted that
Indian reservations were set aside as "homelands" for tribes and have
measured water for agricultural purposes by PIA, but have also
recognized claims to water for other purposes, such as instream flows to
support tribal fisheries. Thus, in Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton,170
the court ruled that water must be awarded to accommodate the broad
purpose of providing a home for the Indians, with consideration given to
the Indians' "need to maintain themselves under changed
circumstances." 171 After concluding that the reservation, like most in the
West, had been set aside for agricultural purposes, the court
supplemented its award of water under the PIA standard with water for
instream flows to support tribal fisheries. 172 Likewise, in United States v.
Adair,173 in answer to the argument that an Indian reservation could have
but a single agricultural, purpose, the court stated,
Neither Cappaert nor New Mexico requires us.... to identify a
single essential purpose which the parties to the 1864
Treaty intended the Klamath Reservation to serve .... In fact,
in Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092, 102 S.Ct. 657, 70 L.Ed.2d 630

166. 861 P.2d 235 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
167. See supranote 164.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 184-189.
169. See Rifkind Report, supra note 130, at 265-66. Nearly all courts have recognized
that, when PIA is used to quantify tribal water rights, the water may be used for other
purposes. See cases discussed in COHEN, supra note 1, § 19.03[6], at 1189.
170. 647 F.2d 42,47-49 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
171. Id. at 47.
172. Id. at 48. The court did so despite its recitation that it was following the primarysecondary purpose test applied to non-Indian federal reservations in United States v. New
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978). 647 F.2d at 47. The court also stated that "Congress envisioned
agricultural pursuits as only a first step in the 'civilizing' process." Id. at 47 n.9 (citing 11
Cong. Rec. 905 (1881)). "This vision of progress implies a flexibility of purpose." Id.
173. 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
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(1981), this court found that provision of a "homeland for
the Indians to maintain their agrarian society," id. at 47, as
well as "preservation of the tribe's access to fishing
grounds," id. at 48, were dual purposes behind
174
establishment of the Colville Reservation.
Other courts, both state and federal, have recognized rights to water to
provide habitat for reserved fishing rights on reservations with fishing as
a purpose.1 75
174. 723 F.2d at 1410. In the non-Indian federal reserved right context, the Supreme
Court held that federal reserved rights will only be implied where needed to fulfill the
"primary purposes" of the reservation and only if that primary purpose would be "entirely
defeated" without an implied reservation of water. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S.
696 (1978). This rigid standard should not be applied to Indian reservations. See COHEN,
supra note 1, § 19.03[4], at 1181 ("The significant differences between Indian reservations
and federal reserved lands indicates that the [primary-secondary] distinction should not
apply."). One state court used that test to limit the award of water under the Winters
doctrine. In re All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, 99 (Wyo.
1988), affd sub nom. by an equally divided court, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406
(1989) (applying primary purpose test strictly and holding that domestic, municipal, and
commercial uses were subsumed within agricultural right).
175. The Washington Supreme Court recognized that tribes with treaty language or
history reflecting a reservation of aboriginal rights to fish also have water rights for
instream flow habitat protection. Dep't of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrigation Dist.,
850 P.2d 1306, 1317 (Wash. 1993) ("Water to fulfill the fishing rights under the treaty may
be found to have been reserved, if fishing was a primary purpose of the reservation." The
parties agreed that water was reserved for fisheries, so the court's statement cannot be
described as a holding.). On remand, the trial court explicitly held that the Yakama
Nation's instream flow right extended off the reservation to support usual and accustomed
fisheries. In the Matter of the Determination of the Rights to the Use of Surface Waters of
the Yakima River Drainage Basin, No. 77-2-01484-5, Final Order Re: Treaty Reserved Water
Rights at Usual and Accustomed Fishing Places, at 3-4 (Yakima County Super. Ct. Mar. 1,
1995); In the Matter of the Determination of the Rights to the Use of Surface Waters of the
Yakima River Drainage Basin, No. 77-2-01484-5, Memorandum Opinion: Treaty Reserved
Water Rights at Usual and Accustomed Fishing Places (Yakima Super. Ct., Sept. 1, 1994).
See also Joint Board of Control of the Flathead, Mission and Jocko Irrigation Dists. v. United
States, 832 F.2d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The action of the BIA in establishing stream
flow and pool levels necessary to protect tribal fisheries is not unreviewable. In making its
determination, however, the BIA is acting as trustee for the Tribes. Because any aboriginal
fishing rights secured by treaty are prior to all irrigation rights, neither the BIA nor the
Tribes are subject to a duty of fair and equal distribution of reserved fishery waters. Only
after fishery waters are protected does the BIA, acting as Officer-in-Charge of the irrigation
project, have a duty to distribute fairly and equitably the remainingwaters among irrigators
of equal priority."); United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Wash. 1982), affd in
part & rev'd in part, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984) (water reserved to maintain favorable
temperature conditions to support fishery); Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley
Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1985) (court acted appropriately in ordering release
of water to protect habitat for treaty fishery); State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 764-66 (Mont. 1985) (tribal
reserved rights may include water for fisheries as well as agriculture and other purposes);
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In the latest chapter of the Gila River Adjudication, the Arizona
Supreme Court "decline[d] to approve the use of PIA as the exclusive
176
quantification measure for determining water rights on Indian lands."
The Court rejected the notion that the United States created Indian
reservations for agricultural purposes alone' 77 and concluded that "the
purpose of a federal Indian reservation is to serve as a 'permanent home
and abiding place' to the Native American people living there." 178 This
seems consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Arizona 1.179 The
Arizona Supreme Court went on to note the inequitable manner in
which reservations might be treated depending upon their geographic
location-tribes in alluvial plains would receive unduly large awards,
while those in mountainous regions would receive little water. 180
According to the court, such potential inequities counsel in favor of a
more flexible analysis, which takes modem circumstances into account
and permits courts in some cases to award less water than is
demonstrated under the PIA measure. 181 The court settled on this
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 992 P.2d 244 (1999) (enjoining issuance of
permits to non-Indians until tribal water rights are quantified); In re Adjudication of the
Existing Rights to the Use of All the Water, 55 P.3d 396,405 (Mont. 2002) (same).
A state district court in Idaho rejected Indian reserved rights for instream flows. In re
SRBA, Case No. 39576, Consolidated Subcase No. 03-10022 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Nov. 10, 1999);
see also United States v. Idaho, 51 P.3d 1110 (Idaho 2002) (rejecting attempt to set aside
district court decision on conflict of interest grounds). For analysis of the trial court's
decision, see Michael C. Blumm et al., Judicial Termination of Treaty Water Rights: The Snake
River Case, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 449 (2000). Although Congress mooted the controversy by
approving the Snake River Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. 108-447, 108 Stat. 2809,
3431, the United States had taken a position firmly supportive of tribal claims. In its Brief to
the Idaho Supreme Court on appeal, the Justice Department relied on the foregoing
authorities for the proposition that, "these federal and state court decisions lead ineluctably
to the conclusion that, at a minimum, water rights for fishery purposes were reserved on all
streams located within the exterior boundaries of the 1855 [Nez Perce] Reservation and
outside of that boundary, for all other streams where there is evidence of Nez Perce 'usual
and accustomed' fishing places." In Re SRBA,Case No. 39576, Subcase No. 10022, Brief of
Appellant United States, at 28 (Nov. 22, 2003).
176. In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System
& Source, 35 P.3d 68, 79 (Ariz. 2001) [hereinafter Gila V] (one of five Gila adjudication
cases). See Cosens, supra note 160, at 858-59.
177. Gila V, 35 P.3d at 76.
178. Id.
179. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 616 (1983) ("We held that the creation of the
Reservations by the federal government implied an allotment of water necessary to 'make
the reservation livable.'"). See also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 n.15 (1981)
("this Court has held that Indian tribes retain rights to river waters necessary to make their
reservations livable.").
180. Gila V, 35 P.3d at 78.
181. Id. at 78-79. After stating that the standard might yield too little
for some tribes, the
court stated that the PIA standard forces tribes to "pretend to be farmers" when farming is
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approach in part by holding that the Winters doctrine is governed by the
concept of "minimal need," 182 which was announced in a non-Indian
federal rights case. 183 The approach, which has never been applied by the
U.S. Supreme Court to Indian reserved rights, dictates that the courts
find a reserved right to "only that amount of water necessary to fulfill
the purpose of the reservation, no more."' 84 According to the Arizona
Supreme Court, tribes need not fear that the approach will prejudice
their interests, since the lower courts "must [award an amount of water
that will] satisfy both present and future needs of the reservation as a
livable homeland." 18 5 The Arizona Supreme Court did not entirely
preclude the use of PIA, 186 and instead held that many additional factors
should be considered, including: past use; tribal history; uses that
promote tribal culture; present and future population; and proposed
master land use plans. 87 The Court cautioned that "the foregoing list of
factors is not exclusive. The lower court must be given the latitude to
consider other information it deems relevant to determining tribal water
rights." 18 The court was frank in recognizing that its standard is vague
and likely to result in a "difficult, time consuming process." 189 Indeed, it
echoes in some ways the states' argument that was rejected in Arizona v.

in fact on the decline. Id. This ignores the fact that, if tribes do not use the water because a
project can not be built, the water remains for others to use. See Report of Special Master
Tuttle at 90-91 n.5 (Feb. 22, 1982), Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983). If the water is
used for other purposes, the economic benefits inuring to the tribe fulfill the purpose in
creating the reservation consistent with the purpose in setting aside reservations as
homelands.
182. Gila V, 35 P.3d at 77.
183. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128,141 (1976).
184. Gila V, 35 P.3d at 77, citing Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141. Like the primary-secondary
purpose test, the minimal need concept has never been applied to Indian reservations.
185. Id. at 77. In the course of its holding, the Court rejected the primary-secondary
purposes test that has been applied in the non-Indian federal reserved rights cases. Id. at 76.
See supra note 174.
186. See id. at 80. "However, future irrigation projects are subject to a PIA-type analysis:
irrigation must be both practically and economically feasible." Id.
187. See id. at 79-80. In response to arguments by the State that the inquiry should be
conducted in way that is sensitive to junior non-Indian uses, the court stated,
The court's function is to determine the amount of water necessary to
effectuate this purpose, tailored to the reservation's minimal need. We
believe that such a minimalist approach demonstrates appropriate
sensitivity and consideration of existing users' water rights, and at the
same time provides a realistic basis for measuring tribal entitlements.
Id. at 81. But cf. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 752 F.2d 397, 405 (9th Cir. 1985)
(Where "reserved rights are properly implied, they arise without regard to equities which
might favor competing water users."). See also Mergen & Liu, supra note 159, at 695.
188. Gila V, 35 P.3d at 81.
189. Id.
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California.190 Furthermore, by rejecting use of the well-defined and
understood PIA methodology for quantifying Indian water rights on
reservations with an agricultural purpose, the court appears to defy the
Supreme Court's express holding in Arizona v. California.'91 Most
important is the fact that in the era of negotiated Indian water
settlements, PIA is the one component that can be objectively evaluated
and thus serves as a cornerstone for the settlement framework. Where
the PIA is limited, parties may move on to consider other purposes
subsumed in the homeland in order to arrive at a settlement that in fact
satisfies tribal needs. It does not help matters to sanction an ad hoc
reduction in right based on the standard that courts and parties have
utilized for the past 35 years.192 The Gila River homeland approach is
sound in cases where the PIA standard yields too little water to make the
reservation livable. 193 In such cases courts should award sufficient water
for other uses that make the reservation a viable homeland.' 94 Thus,
instead of citing inequities to justify giving less to the tribes with ample
irrigable acreage, the Gila River court should have instructed Arizona
trial courts to broadly construe the homeland purpose as including PIA
and give more where necessary to establish a viable homeland for the
tribe. 195 This would normally include water for domestic, commercial,
196
municipal, and industrial purposes.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 132-134.
191. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The court confronted this accusation head on and quoted
language from Special Master Tuttle's Report in Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983)
[Arizona v. California II], indicating that PIA is not necessarily the universal standard and
that the Supreme Court had never indicated any differently. Gila V, 35 P.3d at 78. To the
contrary, the Court seems to have approved PIA as a standard measure for reservations
with agriculture as their primary purpose. See supra note 134. Further, a review of the full
footnote cited by the court indicates support for the PIA standard and express rejection of a
moderate standard of living theory: "Moreover, the irrigable acres standard was adopted to
represent the present and future needs of the Indians. And if the Indians do not consume
the water, it remains in the river for others to use." Report of the Special Master, at 90-91
n.5 (Feb. 22, 1982), Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 155-158. Professor Cosens seems to agree that
the PIA standard should not be abandoned. Cosens, supra note 160, at 872. If anything,
abandonment of the PIA standard would seem to encourage further litigation in hopes that
a court will apply this admittedly vague standard in one party or another's favor.
193. New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Lewis, Nos. 20294 and 22600, Final Judgment at 9
(Chaves County Dist. Ct. June 11, 1989). The court awarded water for a variety of
homeland purposes. See supranote 163.
194. COHEN, supranote 1, § 19.03[5][b], at 1187.
195. United States v. Washington, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (W.D. Wash. 2005). The court
first determined that the reserved water rights doctrine extends to ground water. Id. at
1058, 1068 n.8. The Montana Supreme Court and the Arizona Supreme Court have also
held that the federal reserved water rights doctrine applies to ground water. Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Stults, 59 P.3d 1093, 1099 (Mont. 2002). In re the General
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V. THE UNITED STATES' TRUST RESPONSIBILITY-PROGRAMS,
LITIGATION AND SEiTLEMENTS
The federal government's zeal to develop non-Indian irrigation
interests left tribal needs for irrigation, protection of fisheries and
wildlife habitat, and domestic consumption to languish.197 The Bureau of
Reclamation and its non-Indian constituents have always commanded
the lion's share of resources within the Department of the Interior -both
in terms of dollars for projects and of attorney staff to advise and defend
reclamation programs. 198 Shortly after the resounding victory for Indian
water rights in Winters, the Indian Service sought additional legal
assistance to assert and protect Indian reserved water. 199 The water rights
of tribes, however, were largely ignored. 20° By 1913, the BIA complained
of the favored status held by the Reclamation Service, which "had been
generously staffed to assert and protect water rights for Reclamation
projects." 201 Since establishment of the Bureau of Reclamation in 1902,
the federal government has enshrined the diversion of Indian water for
non-Indian use as federal policy, and simply left the Indian tribes out of
20 2
the development mix.
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System & Source, 989 P.2d 739
(Ariz. 1999) [hereinafter Gila III], cert. denied, sub nom., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. United States,
120 S. Ct. 2705 (2000). Earlier, the Wyoming Supreme Court had agreed that it made sense
to apply the doctrine to ground water, but declined to do so on the ground that no other
court had done so. In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big
Horn River System & All Other Sources, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), affd by equally divided
court sub nom., Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
196. A federal district court recently rejected the Gila River "homeland" approach in
evaluating tribal claims to ground water on a portion of the Lummi Reservation. The court
determined that water should be quantified for agricultural purposes as determined by PIA
and for domestic uses. It relied on the narrow primary-secondary purpose rule applied in
non-Indian reserved rights cases and thus seems to conflict with the Ninth Circuit's
command to broadly construe the purposes of Indian reservations. See supra text
accompanying notes 170-175.
197. See COHEN, supra note 1, § 19.06, at 1221; Chambers & Echohawk, supra note 113, at
448 ("[T]he clear disparity between Indian and non-Indian actual water use which greatly
favors non-Indian use is one cause of widespread poverty."). See also Snake River Water
Rights Act of 2004: Hearing on S. 2605 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong.
61-62, 67 (2004) (Prepared Statement of Anthony D. Johnson, Chairman, Nez Perce Tribal
Exec. Comm., at 8-9, 14); Zuni Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 2003, Pub. L.
108-34 §§ 2, 5, 117 Stat. 782, 785-88.
198. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
199. SHuRTS, supranote 68, at 195.
200. Id. at 195-98.
201. Id.
202. One court of appeals noted this in 1956 when it evaluated an agreement entered
into by the Secretary of the Interior purporting to greatly reduce the amount of water
available to the Yakama Indian Nation.
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In addition to its failure to develop water for Indian agricultural
uses, the federal government did virtually nothing to ensure that water
remained instream to satisfy the needs of fish and wildlife preserved in
treaties and agreements. 203 This all was despite the fact that, in its
dealings with Indians, the United States "has charged itself with moral
obligations of the highest responsibility and trust." 20 4 The extent to
which the federal government meets this trust responsibility depends in
part on funding from Congress and on any given Administration's
priorities, but tribes have judicial recourse as well.
The United States is potentially liable to tribes for money
damages based on harm inflicted by federal mismanagement of tribal
assets.205 In addition, tribes may bring actions for injunctive relief to force
federal agencies to protect tribal assets prospectively. 206 Courts have
recognized claims for damages based on harm to tribal water rights
when the United States failed to protect extant Indian uses from

With an opportunity to study the history of the Winters rule, as it has stood
now for nearly 50 years, we can readily perceive that the Secretary of the
Interior, in acting as he did, improvidently bargained away extremely
valuable rights belonging to the Indians. Perhaps the feature of the whole
matter most worthy of criticism is the apparent failure of the Secretary,
before approving such an arrangement, to obtain legal advice either from
the Solicitor or from the Department of Justice, as to the validity or the
advisability of the proposed agreement. Viewing this contract as an
improvident disposal of three-fourths of that which justly belonged to the
Indians, it cannot be said to be out of character with the sort of thing
which Congress and the Department of the Interior has been doing
throughout the sad history of the Government's dealings with the Indians
and the Indian tribes. That history largely supports the statement: "From
the very beginnings of this nation, the chief issue around which federal
Indian policy has revolved has been, not how to assimilate the Indian
nations whose lands we usurped, but how best to transfer Indian lands
and resources to non-Indians."
United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 337 (9th Cir. 1956) (citing Dorothy
Van de Mark, The Raid on the Reservations, HARPER'S MAG., Mar. 1956). See also WILKINSON,
CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN, supra note 4, at 248.
203. See, e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
204. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286,297 (1942).
205. See United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003); Cohen,
supra note 1, § 5.05[1][bl.
206. See Mary Christina Wood, The Indian Trust Responsibility: ProtectingTribal Lands and
Resources Through Claims of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39 TuLSA L. REV. 355
(2003). In Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1995), however, the
court rejected the tribes' request that the Justice Department be ordered to file what the
United States considered to be "meritless" water right claims in the Snake River Basin
Adjudication.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

upstream diversions, 207 but there have been few cases for damages based
on a general failure to protect Indian water rights. 2°8 In Gila River PimaMaricopaIndian Community v. United States, the court rejected a claim by a
tribe for the failure to develop tribal water resources to the full extent
that might be authorized by the Winters Doctrine. 2°9
The Bureau of Reclamation's traditional preference for
administration of non-Indian projects does not appear to have changed
despite potential liability for damages and efforts to reorient its mission
during the Clinton Administration. Although Reclamation adopted a
formal Indian policy that purports to "actively seek partnerships with
Indian tribes" and be protective of tribal resources, 210 the agency
reportedly has returned to its historic bias in favor of irrigated
agriculture. 211 Today, the most pressure to maintain adequate flows for
207. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. United States, 684 F.2d 852, 863 (Ct. Cl.
1982) ("Accordingly, it is concluded that, to comply with the standard of fair and honorable
dealings, it was incumbent upon the United States, once upstream diversions began to
restrict the Pima and Maricopa agriculture, to take legal action either to attempt to end the
diversions or to restore an alternative equivalent supply if diversions were to continue for
reasons of public policy in favor of settlements.").
208. In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States, 36 Ind. Cl. Comm'n 256 (1975), the
court approved an $8,000,000 settlement based on the failure of the United States to ensure
the delivery of water necessary for a tribal fishery in Pyramid Lake. The settlement
carefully noted that the tribe's rights had not been lost, or taken in a permanent sense. But
in Nevada v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that the additional tribal claims were
barred by res judicata. The Court noted that "[i]f, in carrying out their role as
representative, the Government violated its obligations to the Tribe, then the Tribe's
remedy is against the Government, not against third parties." 463 U.S. 110, 144 n.16 (1983).
See COHEN, supra note 1, § 19.06, at 1225 (collecting cases). Cf. Dep't of Ecology v. Yakima
Reservation Irrigation Dist., 850 P.2d 1306, 1309 (Wash. 1993). The Washington Supreme
Court ruled that a tribe that had filed a damages action against the United States before the
Indian Claims Commission and received damages based on the claim that the federal
government's construction of a reclamation project destroyed tribal fishing sites could not
claim undiminished water rights. Id.
209. The court stated,
The Indian Claims Commission Act, the aim of which was to grant
monetary compensation for past (pre-August 1946) wrongs actually
inflicted by the United States, does not call for damages based on
theoretical maximum "rights" that the Indians were wholly unable to
utilize and to implement at the time, especially where the Government
was under no moral or legal obligation to construct new facilities so that
the Indians could then use the greater amount of water they now claim.
Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. United States, 684 F.2d at 865. The court's
assertion that there was no moral obligation to fulfill promises implicit in treaties is
questionable.
210. Indian Policy of the Bureau of Reclamation (Feb. 25, 1998), http://www.usbr.gov/
native/naao/policies/indianpol.pdf.
211. Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the Bush
Administration,32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 279 (2005) ("The Bureau views Project farmers as its
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fisheries comes from the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 212 rather than
from the assertion of tribal water rights, and even those efforts have
slackened in recent years. For example, fish populations in Upper
213
Klamath Lake and the Klamath River have been in decline for decades
and although the United States asserted water right claims to protect the
tribal fishery dependent on upper Klamath Lake in 1975,214 serious
efforts to increase water quantity in the lake did not begin until after the
fish were listed under the ESA. 215 In the late 1990s however, the agency
also relied on its obligation to protect tribal water rights and fulfill its
216
trust responsibility as it provided more protection for fisheries habitat.
The Bush Administration abruptly reversed course and changed the
Klamath Project's operation scheme to favor increased deliveries for
irrigation interests in 2002, which coincided with the death of 33,000
returning adult salmon. 217 In Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Ass'ns
v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,218 the court of appeals set aside a ten year
operations plan proffered by the Bush Administration for the Klamath
Project as inconsistent with the requirements of the ESA. The plan was
developed amid charges of political meddling on behalf of irrigation
interests.219 In sum, federal program dollars and operations continue the
clients; its first priority is providing them with water. Nationally, the Bureau has
steadfastly resisted incorporating wildlife concerns into its operations."). See also John D.
Leshy, Natural Resources Policy in the Bush (II) Administration: An Outsider's Somewhat
JaundicedAssessment, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 347,359-60 (2004).
212. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544. The ESA can sometimes limit a tribe's exercise of its
reserved water rights when tribal use is dependent on federal actions that require section 7
consultations under the Act. COHEN, supra note 1, § 19.06, at 1221-22. The ESA does not
appear to apply directly to treaty reserved rights. See id. § 17.0414], at 1115-16. Cf. United
States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
213. See Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1209-10 (9th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000).
214. See United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336,342-343 (D. Or. 1979).
215. In 1992, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service issued a Biological Opinion that
required certain minimum elevations for Upper Klamath Lake to avoid jeopardizing these
protected species. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1209
(9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000).
216. The court of appeals approved the Bureau of Reclamation's protective action:
Because Reclamation maintains control of the Dam, it has a responsibility
to divert the water and resources needed to fulfill the Tribes' rights, rights
that take precedence over any alleged rights of the Irrigators. Accordingly,
we hold that the district court did not err in concluding that Reclamation
has the authority to direct operation of the Dam to comply with Tribal
water requirements.
Id. at 1214.
217. Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d
1082,1089 (9th Cir. 2005).
218. Id.
219. As Holly Doremus relates,
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historic orientation toward non-Indian needs despite policy statements
that purport to respect and advance tribal interests in water.
On the other hand, legal theories advanced by the United States
supporting Indian reserved rights have generally been consistent and
beneficial to Indian tribes, although serious conflicts of interest may
impede zealous representation by the government.220 The Justice
Department (on behalf of the Department of the Interior as trustee)
regularly asserts tribal water right claims for broad homeland purposes,
in addition to advancing the PIA standard for reservations with an
agricultural purpose.221 The federal government also advocates
consistently in favor of reserved rights to instream flows to support on
and off-reservation fishing rights. 222 In these latter instances, the legal
positions usually have no immediate impact and thus are easier to
adhere to, as opposed to implementation of policies that might
immediately disrupt water deliveries to irrigators223 or require
substantial expenditures. Additionally, increasing population pressures
point to an ever-increasing demand for water in metropolitan areas of
There have also been a series of charges that political appointees have
overridden the views of agency biologists as key biological opinions have
moved up the chain of command. Michael Kelly, a [National Marine
Fisheries Service] biologist, asserted that the agency's 2002 biological
opinion on the Klamath Project (which for the most part endorsed the
Bureau of Reclamation's ten-year operations plan) was softened by agency
managers without consulting the biologists.
Doremus, supra note 211, at 289. After the court of appeals remanded the case to the agency
for further proceedings, the district court again set aside the agency's supplemental
Biological Opinion in which it attempted to justify the earlier decision. Pac. Coast Fed'n of
Fishermen's Ass'n v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Order Granting Motion for Injunctive
Relief Following Remand, Civ. No. C02-2006 SBA (Mar. 23,2006) 2006 WL 798920.
220. See Juliano, supra note 3, at 1329-36. Professor Juliano describes how the United
States finds itself advancing tribal interests in water rights cases as it also advances claims
on behalf of the Bureau of Reclamation, the Forest Service, and other agencies to the same
water. Id. at 1331-33.
221. In a recent appellate brief, the federal government argued, "The fundamental
purpose in establishing Indian reservations -to provide a permanent homeland capable of
supporting a self-sustaining community -could not be achieved if water rights were
limited to those that further a single, narrow purpose, or if some of the water rights
necessary to support a community had to be acquired in accordance with state law." Brief
of the United States in Response to the Skokomish Indian Tribe's Petition for Additional
Rehearing By the En Banc Panel or Full Court Review of the En Banc Opinion Dated March
4, 2005 at 6 (Apr. 20, 2005), Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 401 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.
2005), opinion superceded, 410 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 2005).
222. A review of the litigation reveals that the homeland theories and claims for
instream flows have remained consistent over time. See supra text accompanying notes
170-175.
223. See supra notes 211-214. Notable exceptions are found in the Kittitas and Flathead
Lake litigation. See supra note 175.
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the West. 224 This increase in water demand necessarily sharpens the
potential for conflict among current users and heightens the scrutiny to
which unquantified Indian reserved rights may be subjected. Because
modem water rights disputes are most often litigated in state courts,
there are fears that courts might manipulate legal standards to reduce
225
tribal shares to water and protect non-Indian uses.
The uncertainty in the law and the complexity of Indian water
rights litigation has prompted many tribes to opt for settlement
negotiations to quantify their rights. 226 The federal government has a
general policy favoring the negotiation and settlement of Indian water
rights.227 Unfortunately, the criteria and procedures for settlement place
substantial emphasis on protecting the federal treasury, 228 and less on
224. W. WATER POL'Y REV. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 10, at xiii. In 1990, there were
179 million acre feet of water withdrawn for various uses compared to 135 million acre feet
in 1960. Id. at 2-23. Agricultural withdrawals constituted 78% of the uses and domestic uses
were 8% of the uses in 1990, compared to 86% and 5% respectively in 1960. Industrial uses
held steady at 5% during the period. Id.
225. See Richard B. Collins, The Future Course of the Winters Doctrine, 56 U. COLO. L. REV.
481, 484-85 (1985). See also NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 479.
Because of potential conflict between Indian and non-Indian water users
and to avoid the suspicion of bias that might attend adjudication by
elected State officials, the Commission recommends that Indian water
rights be adjudicated in Federal court, the traditional forum for this kind
of litigation. An effort should be made to simplify the litigation when
numerous water users are affected, by allowing the State to represent them
parenspatriae.
Id.
226. Congress has approved 20 Indian water right settlements since 1978. See COHEN,
supra note 1, § 19.05[2], at 1212. In addition to the 18 settlements cited in COHEN, Congress
in 2004 approved settlements for the Nez Perce Tribe, Snake River Water Rights Settlement
Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-447, 108 Stat. 2809, 3431, and the Gila River Indian Community,
Arizona Water Settlements Act, Pub. L. 108-451, 118 Stat. 3478 (2004). As Professor Frickey
has noted, treating the litigation arena as "establishing the framework for negotiation
between sovereigns, rather than merely for litigation in federal courts, holds the promise
both of greater participation by tribes in the formulation of the federal law that purports to
govern them and of the evolution of a more normatively attractive and coherent
approach." Frickey, supra note 13, at 1757.
227. Criteria and Procedures for the Participation of the Federal Government in
Negotiations for the Settlement of Indian Water Rights Claims, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (Mar. 12,
1990).
228. The criteria and procedures provide:
Federal contributions to a settlement should not exceed the sum of the
following two elements: a. First, calculable legal exposure -litigation cost
and judgment obligations if the case is lost; Federal and non-Federal
exposure should be calculated on a present value basis taking into account
the size of the claim, value of the water, timing of the award, likelihood of
loss. b. Second, additional costs related to Federal trust or programmatic
responsibilities (assuming the U.S. obligation as trustee can be compared
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recognition of a moral obligation to settle disputes the United States had
a substantial hand in creating. 229 The government's position in water
230
settlements, while ostensibly guided by the Criteria and Procedures,
has been inconsistent and subject to frequent congressional overrides. 23 1
Of course, the ability to overcome a threat of a presidential veto depends
on the strength of a given state's congressional delegation, or on the
ability to attach a settlement to a veto-proof appropriations bill.
Indian water rights settlements are often said to hold the
promise for the actual delivery of water to reservations and Indian
people, although there is scant evidence that this is true. 232 On the other
hand, the tribes with settlements have legal entitlements to water that
are of great value now and in the future, and non-Indians obtain the
certainty that is claimed as necessary for future planning. The use of
water marketing provisions in settlements facilitates economically
efficient allocation of water and can provide substantial economic
233
benefits to Indian tribes.
CONCLUSION
The success of the settlement process depends primarily on the
willingness of the federal government to assist and encourage
negotiations, and more importantly, to provide the lion's share of
funding to implement any agreements. When in the negotiated
settlement context, the federal government should not rigidly limit the
to existing precedence).- Federal contributions relating to programmatic
responsibilities should be justified as to why such contributions cannot be
funded through the normal budget process.
55 Fed. Reg. at 9223.
229. The federal government's failure to conclude any Indian water rights settlements
from 1993 to 1996 based on budgetary constraints was severely criticized within Indian
country and by state representatives. See Barbara A. Cosens, The 1997 Water Rights
Settlement Between the State of Montana and the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's
Reservation: The Role of Community and of the Trustee, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 255, 257
(1998) ("The failure of the federal government to effectively participate in and support
settlement discussions calls into question its ability to fulfill its role as trustee to the many
Indian tribes still struggling to settle their water rights.").
230. Criteria and Procedures for the Participation of the Federal Government in
Negotiations for the Settlement of Indian Water Rights Claims, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (Mar. 12,
1990).
231. McCOOL, supra note 5, at 119 ("The favored strategy was just to ignore them
[criteria and procedures] and take negotiated agreements straight to Congress, with a
conspicuous lack of [Office of Management and Budget] review.").
232. Id. at 107-08 (stating that, while 2.8 million acre feet of water per year were
quantified in 15 Indian water rights settlements, there was a net increase in actual
deliveries of only 72,000 acre feet of water as a result of settlements).
233. See COHEN, supranote 1, § 19.03[7][c], at 1192-94.
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federal contribution by the assessment of "calculable legal exposure" as
defined in the criteria and procedures for settlements. 234 Instead, the
federal position in settlement should take into account the inequitable
treatment that developing tribal economies received historically in the
water context. And while legal exposure is relevant, the scope of such
exposure can be easily manipulated depending on the assumptions
made in a given case. Instead, the federal government should engage in a
transparent analysis of the tribal claims to water, tribal needs, potential
federal liability, and the other potential benefits of settlement to the
Indian and non-Indian community. There will be some cases where
many other issues are dealt with as part of a comprehensive settlement
of water rights litigation and related matters, such as ESA issues.235 The
Administration should look to the large body of settlements (there are
now 20) to help chart a course for new settlement proposals. Funding of
settlements should not reduce the BIA's budget.
Most importantly, the President should firmly and officially
endorse the policy of settling Indian water right claims through
legislation when tribes request assistance in negotiations. This should
include a directive that funds for settlement are an Administration
priority and the Office of Management and Budget should not be the
arbiter of Administration support. Finally, the United States should
support pre-litigation efforts to arrive at solutions and not wait for a
litigation-induced crisis to trigger federal financial and staff support for
settlement discussions.

234. See supranote 226.
235. The Snake River Water Rights Settlement Act is the prime example of such a
comprehensive settlement. See supra note 225.

